Abstract. We study the natural problem of secure n-party computation (in the passive, computationally unbounded attack model) of the n-product function f G (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = x 1 · x 2 · · · x n in an arbitrary finite group (G, ·), where the input of party Pi is xi ∈ G for i = 1, . . . , n. For flexibility, we are interested in protocols for f G which require only black-box access to the group G (i.e. the only computations performed by players in the protocol are a group operation, a group inverse, or sampling a uniformly random group element). Our results are as follows. First, on the negative side, we show that if (G, ·) is non-abelian and n ≥ 4, then no n/2 -private protocol for computing f G exists. Second, on the positive side, we initiate an approach for construction of black-box protocols for fG based on k-of-k threshold secret sharing schemes, which are efficiently implementable over any black-box group G. We reduce the problem of constructing such protocols to a combinatorial colouring problem in planar graphs. We then give two constructions for such graph colourings. Our first colouring construction gives a protocol with optimal collusion resistance t < n/2, but has exponential communication complexity O(n 2t+1 t 2 ) group elements (this construction easily extends to general adversary structures). Our second probabilistic colouring construction gives a protocol with (close to optimal) collusion resistance t < n/µ for a graph-related constant µ ≤ 2.948, and has efficient communication complexity O(nt 2 ) group elements. Furthermore, we believe that our results can be improved by further study of the associated combinatorial problems.
Introduction
Background. Groups form a natural mathematical structure for cryptography. In particular, the most popular public-key encryption schemes today (RSA [17] · log t) (for n/2.948 < t < n/2, the protocol of [5] is still asymptotically the most efficient known proven protocol). Note that, for any finite group G, we can always take R(G) to be the group algebra (or group ring) of G over GF (2) , which can be viewed as a |G|-dimensional vector space over GF (2) consisting of all linear combinations of the elements of G (the basis vectors) with coefficients from GF (2) (the product operation of R(G) is defined by the operation of G extended by linearity and associativity, and the addition operation of R(G) is defined componentwise). However, for this generic choice of R(G) we have (R(G)) = |G|, so, assuming (G) = log |G|, our protocol reduces communication complexity by a factor Θ( |G| log |G| · log t), which is exponentially large in the representation length log |G|. In the worst case, we may have (R(G)) = Θ( (G)) and our protocol may only give a saving factor O(log t) over the protocol from [5] , e.g. this is the case for G = GL(k, 2) (the group of invertible k × k matrices over GF (2) ). We remark that this O(log t) saving factor arises essentially from the fact that Shamir's secret sharing for 2t+1 shares requires a ring of size greater than 2t + 1, and hence, for a secret from GF (2) , the share length is greater than the secret length by a factor Θ(log t) (whereas our approach does not use Shamir's sharing and hence does not suffer from this length expansion). On the other hand, for sharing a secret from GF (q) for 'large' q (q > 2t + 1), Shamir's scheme is ideal, so for specific groups such as G = GL(k, q) with q > 2t + 1, the communication cost of the protocols from [2, 5] reduces to O(nt 2 · (R(G))).
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains definitions and results we use. In Section 3 we show that t < n/2 is necessary for secure computation of f G . In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we show how to construct a t-private protocol for f G given a 't-Reliable' colouring of a planar graph. Then in Section 4.4, we present two constructions of such t-Reliable colourings. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes some generalizations and extensions, and Section 5 concludes with some open problems. Some proofs are omitted from this version of the paper due to space limitations -they are available in the full version [6] .
We recall the definition of secure multi-party computation in the passive (semihonest), computationally unbounded attack model, restricted to deterministic symmetric functionalities and perfect emulation [10] . Let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 1. Let f : ({0, 1}
* ) n → {0, 1} * denote an n-input, single-output function, and let Π be an n-party protocol for computing f . We denote the party input sequence by x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), the joint protocol view of parties in subset I ⊆ [n] by VIEW Π I (x), and the protocol output by OUT Π (x). For 0 < t < n, we say that Π is a t-private protocol for computing f if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S, such that, for every I ⊂ [n] with #I ≤ t and every x ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n , the random variables
are identically distributed, where x I denotes the projection of the n-ary sequence x on the coordinates in I.
To prove our result we will invoke a combinatorial characterization of 2-input functions for which a 1-private 2-party computation protocol exists, due to Kushilevitz [12] . To state this result, we need the following definitions. 
Definition 2. Let M = C × D be a matrix, where C is the set of rows and D is the set of columns. Define a binary relation ∼ on pairs of rows of M as follows:
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction; we show that if a n 2 -private protocol Π exists for f G for n ≥ 4, then we can construct a 1-private 2-party protocol for a 2-input function f G whose matrix M contains a forbidden submatrix, thus contradicting Theorem 1. Lemma 1. Suppose there exists a
Proof. Given party P 1 with input (x 1 , x 3 ) and party P 2 with input (x 2 , x 4 ), the protocol Π runs as follows. First, if n ≥ 5, we partition the set {5, . . . , n} into two disjoint subsets S 1 and S 2 such that the size of both S 1 and S 2 is at most n 2 − 2 (namely, if n is even we take #S 1 = #S 2 = n/2 − 2, and if n is odd we take #S 1 = (n − 3)/2 and #S 2 = (n − 5)/2). Then Π (P 1 , P 2 ) consists of running the n-party protocol Π(P 1 , . . . , P n ) where:
-P 1 plays the role of parties (P 1 , P 3 , {P i } i∈S 1 ) in Π, and sets those parties inputs to be
, and x i = 1 for all i ∈ S 1 , respectively. -P 2 plays the role of parties (P 2 , P 4 , {P i } i∈S 2 ) in Π, and sets those parties inputs to be x 2 = x 2 , x 4 = x 4 and x i = 1 for all i ∈ S 2 , respectively.
The 1-privacy of protocol Π (P 1 , P 2 ) for computing f G follows from the n 2 -privacy of protocol Π(P 1 , . . . , P n ) for computing f G because: 4 ), the view of P 1 (resp. P 2 ) in protocol Π (P 1 , P 2 ) is identical to the view of a set of at most n 2 parties in protocol Π(P 1 , . . . , P n ) whose inputs are known to P 1 (resp. P 2 ), with special settings of 1 for some inputs. Thus the same view simulator algorithm S of Π can be used to simulate the view in Π .
This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. For any non-abelian group G, the matrix M for the 2-input function
Proof. Observe from Definitions 2 and 3 that any 2 × 2 matrix with 3 equal elements and a fourth distinct element is a forbidden matrix. Now recall that the rows of matrix M for f G are indexed by (x 1 , x 3 ) ∈ G 2 , the columns of M are indexed by (x 2 , x 4 ) ∈ G 2 , and the entry of M at row (x 1 , x 3 ) and column Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we conclude that if a n 2 -private protocol Π exists for f G for n ≥ 4, then we obtain a contradiction to Theorem 1. This completes the proof.
Constructions

Our Approach: Black Box Non-Abelian Group Protocols
Our protocols will treat the group G as a black box in the sense that the only computations performed by players in our protocols will be one of the following three: Multiply (Given x ∈ G and y ∈ G, compute x · y), Inverse (Given x ∈ G, compute x −1 ), and Random Sampling (Choose a uniformly random x ∈ G). It is easy to see that these three operations are sufficient for implementing a perfect k-of-k threshold secret sharing scheme. We use this k-of-k scheme as a fundamental building block in our protocols. The following proposition is easy to prove. 
Construction of n-Product Protocol from a Shared 2-Product Subprotocol
We begin by reducing the problem of constructing a t-private protocol for the n-product function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = x 1 · · · x n (where party P i holds input x i for i = 1, . . . , n), to the problem of constructing a subprotocol for the Shared 2-Product function f (x, y) = x · y, where inputs x, y and output z = x · y are shared among the parties. We define for this subprotocol a so-called strong tprivacy definition, which will be needed later to prove the (standard) t-privacy of the full n-product protocol built from subprotocol Π S . The definition of strong t-privacy requires the adversary's view simulator to simulate all output shares except one share not held by the adversary, in addition to simulating the internal subprotocol view of the adversary.
Definition 5 (Shared n-Party 2-Product Subprotocol). A n-Party Shared 2-Product subprotocol Π S with sharing parameter and share ownership functions
has the following features:
and 
of the party which holds the jth input shares s x (j) and s y (j) and jth output share s z (j), respectively.
Remark 2.
The adversary view simulator S Π S for collusion I is given all input shares except the j * th x-share s x (j * ) and j * y th y-share s y (j * y ) (where j * , j * y ∈ [ ], which depend on I, are indices of shares given to players not in I), and outputs all output shares except the j * th share s z (j * ) of z. Because, for each I, the same value of index j * is used for both x-input shares and output shares, this allows multiple simulator runs to be composed, using output shares of one subprotocol run as x-input shares in a following subprotocol run, as shown in the security proof of the following construction. If in addition, symmetric strong t-privacy is achieved, one can use output shares of one subprotocol run as either x-input or y-input shares for the following subprotocol run, allowing for more efficient protocols.
We now explain our construction of an n-Product Protocol Π(T, Π S ) given a binary computation tree T for f G with n leaf nodes corresponding to the n protocol inputs (as illustrated in Fig. 1 ), and a Shared 2-Product subprotocol Π S with sharing parameter and share ownership functions O x , O y , O z . The protocol Π begins with each party P j computing an -of-sharing of its input x j , and distributing out these shares to the n parties according to the share ownership functions O x , O y of Π S . Then protocol Π performs each of the internal node 2-product computations of the computation tree T on -of-sharings of the internal node's two children nodes by running the shared 2-product subprotocol Π S , resulting in an -of-sharing of the internal node value. Eventually this recursive process gives an -of-sharing of the root node value x 1 · · · x n of T , which is broadcast to all parties. The following Lemma establishes the t-privacy of protocol Π(T, Π S ), assuming the correctness and strong t-privacy of subprotocol Π S . Refer to [6] for a proof.
Lemma 3. For any binary tree T with n leaves, if the n-party Shared 2-Product subprotocol Π S satisfies correctness and symmetric strong t-privacy (see Definition 5), then protocol Π(T, Π S ) is an n-party t-private protocol for computing
For the slanted linear binary tree T slin shown in Fig 1(b) , the above result holds even if Π S satisfies (ordinary) strong t-privacy (i.e. symmetric strong t-privacy is not needed in this case).
Construction of a t-Private n-Party Shared 2-Product Subprotocol from a t-Reliable n-Colouring of a Planar Graph
Next, we reduce the problem of constructing a t-Private n-Party Shared 2-Product Subprotocol Π S to a combinatorial problem defined below of finding a 't-Reliable n-Colouring' of the nodes of a planar graph. We note that our notion of a 't-Reliable n-Colouring' is closely related to a similar notion defined in [7] , and shown to be equivalent to the existence of private communication via a network graph in which each node is assigned one of n possible colours and the adversary controls all nodes with colours belonging to a t-colour subset I. Consider a Planar Directed Acyclic Graph (PDAG) G having 2 source (input) nodes drawn in a horizontal row at the top, sink (output) nodes drawn in a horizontal row at the bottom, and σ G nodes overall. We use PDAG G to represent a blackbox protocol, where the input/output nodes are labelled by the protocol input/output group elements, and the internal graph nodes are labelled by intermediate protocol values. Each internal graph node is also assigned a colour specifying the player which computes the internal node value. The graph edges represent group elements sent from one player to another. The computation performed at each node is multiplication of the values on all incoming edges and resharing the product along the outgoing edges using the k-of-k secret sharing scheme in Proposition 1. All computations in the ith round of the 2-Product subprotocol correspond to the ith row (from the top) in the PDAG. Communications between nodes correspond to edges between consecutive rows.
Actually to construct a protocol for any non-abelian group our requirement on graph G is slightly stronger than planarity and can be precisely defined as follows. 
Definition 6 (Admissible PDAG). We call graph G an
i.e. the rightmost node on level i + 1 connected to node (i, j) is to the left of (or equal to) the leftmost node on level i + 1 connected to node (i, j + 1).
We call the left source nodes on row 1 (indexed (1, 1) , . . . , (1, )) the 'xinput' nodes and the last source nodes on row 1 (indexed (1, + 1) , . . . , (1, 2 ) ) the 'y-input' nodes. By ith x-input node, we mean the x-input node at position i from the left. We define the ith y-input and ith output node similarly.
Let
be an n-Colouring function that associates to each node (i, j) of G a colour C(i, j) chosen from a set of n possible colours [n] . We now define the notion of a t-Reliable n-Colouring. Remark 3. The paths P AT H x and P AT H y in Definition 7 are free to move in any direction along each edge of directed graph G, i.e. for this definition we regard G as an undirected graph (throughout the paper we assume that a path is simple, i.e. free of cycles; hence each node on the path is only visited once).
Definition 7 (t-Reliable n-Colouring
An example of an admissible PDAG with I-avoiding paths P AT H x and P AT H y is shown in Fig 2(a) . Given an admissible PDAG G (with share parameter and size parameter m) and an associated t-Reliable n-Colouring C : 
computes v (i,j) by multiplying the shares received from nodes at previous row i − 1 (labels of edges between a node on row i − 1 and node (i, j)), ordered from left to right according to the sender node column index.
-If i = m, P C(m,j) sets output share j to be the label v (m,j) ,
q (i,j) denote the ordered column indices of the nodes on level i + 1 which are connected to node (i, j) by an edge. P C(i,j) chooses q (i,j) − 1 uniformly random elements from G and computes a q
.
and labels edge from node (i, j) to node (i + 1, η
Note that the correctness of Π S follows from the fact that the product of node values at each row of PDAG G is preserved and hence equal to x · y, thanks to condition (1) in Definition 6.
Lemma 4. If G is an admissible PDAG and C is a t-Reliable n-Colouring for G then Π S (G, C) achieves strong t-privacy. Moreover, if C is a Symmetric tReliable n-Colouring, then Π S (G, C) achieves Symmetric strong t-privacy.
Proof. (Sketch) The full proof of Lemma 4 can be found in [6] . Here we only explain the main idea by considering the case when the I-avoiding paths P AT H x and P AT H y only have downward edges (in [6] we extend the argument to paths with upward edges). Consider P AT H x from the j * th x-input node to the j * th output node. At the first node P AT H x (1) on the path, although the node value v(1) = s x (j * ) is not known to the view simulator S Π S , we may assume, by Proposition 1, that in the real subprotocol Π S , when node P AT H x (1) shares out its node label among its q outgoing edges, it sends new random elements (labels) r i on each of the q − 1 outgoing edges not on P AT H x . Thus simulator S Π S can easily simulate all outgoing edge values of P AT H x (1) which are not on P AT H x . The same argument shows that for all kth nodes P AT H x (k) and P AT H y (k) on P AT H x and P AT H y respectively, simulator S Π S can simulate all values on outgoing edges of P AT H x (k) and P AT H y (k) which are not on P AT H x or P AT H y by independent random elements. The values on edges along P AT H x or P AT H y depend on the inputs s x (j * ) and s y (j * y ) which are not known to simulator S Π S , but since the paths P AT H x and P AT H y are I-avoiding, these values are not in the view of I and need not be simulated by S Π S . Since S Π S knows all inputs to Π S it can compute all other edge values in the Π S , including all outputs except the j * th one (which is on P AT H x and P AT H y ), as required.
Constructions of t-Reliable n-Colourings of Planar Graphs
We now present two general constructions of t-Reliable n-Colourings of planar graphs which can be used to build t-Private n-Party protocols for the n-Product function in any finite group as explained in the previous sections. Our first deterministic construction achieves optimal collusion security (t < n/2) but has exponential complexity ( = n t ). Our second probabilistic construction has a slightly suboptimal collusion security (t < n/2.948) but has a very efficient linear complexity ( = O(n)).
The PDAG. The admissible PDAG G tri ( , ) that we consider has sharing parameter and has × nodes. It is shown in Fig. 2(b) . The nodes of G tri ( , ) are arranged in an × node grid. Let (i, j) denote the node at row i ∈ [ ] (from the top) and column j (from the left). There are three types of edges in directed graph G tri ( , ): (1) Horizontal edge: An edge connecting two adjacent nodes on the same row, directed from right to left (i.e. from node (i, j) to node 
The nodes on the top row (row 1) of G tri are the x-input nodes, indexed from left to right. The top nodes on the rightmost column of G tri (column ) are the y-input nodes, indexed from top to bottom. Remark 4. The reader may notice that the above specification of G tri does not formally satisfy the convention for drawing an admissible PDAG as defined in Def. 6, due to the horizontal edges and the fact that the y-input nodes are arranged along a column, rather than along the same row as the x-input nodes. However, it is easy to see that G tri can also be drawn strictly according to Def. 6. Namely by rotating the drawing of G tri in Fig. 2 by 45 degrees anticlockwise, the horizontal edges become diagonal edges, and x-inputs and y-inputs can be formally put on the same row by adding appropriate 'connecting' nodes of the same colour as the corresponding input nodes of G tri . These are only formal changes in drawing conventions, and there is no change in the protocol itself. In this section we use the drawing convention in Fig. 2 for clarity.
Remark 5.
All diagonal edges in the definition of G tri above are parallel (with a 'positive slope', when using the drawing convention in Fig 2) . However, it is clear that the admissible PDAG requirements are still satisfied if we remove from G tri some 'positive slope' diagonal edges and add some 'negative slope' diagonal edges (connecting a node (i, j) to node (i + 1, j + 1), for some i ∈ [ ] \ { }, j ∈ [ ] \ { }), as long as planarity of G is preserved (no two diagonal edges intersect). We denote such 'generalised' PDAGs by G gtri . -privacy (which is optimal, as shown in Section 3). Unfortunately, the sharing parameter in this construction = n t , is exponential in t (and therefore the protocol communication cost is also exponential in t).
Colouring C comb for graph Gtri( , ) with = 
Lemma 5. For n ≥ 2t + 1, the colouring C comb is a Symmetric t-Reliable nColouring for graph G tri ( , ), with = n t .
Proof. Given each t-colour subset I ⊆ [n], let j * denote the index of I in the sequence I 1 , . . . , I of all t-colour subsets used to construct C comb , i.e I j * = I. By construction of C comb , none of the nodes of G tri ( , ) along column j * have colours in I j * = I. Hence one can take column j * of G tri ( , ) as P AT H x . Similarly, we also know that none of the nodes of G tri ( , ) along row j * have colours in I j * = I, so one can take P AT H y to consist of all nodes on row j * which are on columns j ≥ j * , followed by all nodes on column j * which are on rows i ≥ j * . Thus C comb is a Symmetric t-Reliable n-Colouring for graph G tri ( , ), as required.
Remark 6. The colouring C comb remains a Symmetric t-Reliable n-Colouring even if we remove all diagonal edges from G tri ( , ) (since the paths P AT H x and P AT H y only contain vertical and horizontal edges).
Combining Lemma 5 (applied to a subset of n = 2t + 1 ≤ n colours from [n]) with Lemmas 3 and 4, we have Second Construction C rand (t < n/2.948 and = O(n)). It is natural to ask whether the exponentially large sharing parameter = n t can be reduced.
Our second construction C rand shows that this is certainly the case when t < n/2.948, achieving a linear sharing parameter = O(n).
As a first step towards our second construction, we relax the properties required from C in Definition 7 to slightly simpler requirements for the square graph G tri ( , ) (i.e. = ), as follows.
Definition 8 (Weakly t-Reliable n-Colouring). We say that
-There exists an I-avoiding path P x in G from a node on the top row (row 1) to a node on the bottom row (row ). We call such a path an I-avoiding top-bottom path. -There exists an I-avoiding path P y in G from a node on the rightmost column (column ) to a node on the leftmost column (column 1). We call such a path an I-avoiding right-left path.
Note that in the above definition of Weak t-Reliability, the index of the starting node of path P x in the top row need not be the same as the index of the exit node of P x in the bottom row (whereas in the definition of t-Reliability, P AT H x must exit at the same position along the output row as the position in the top row where P AT H x begins). The following lemma shows that finding a Weakly t-Reliable n-Colouring for the square graph G tri ( , ) is sufficient for constructing a (standard) t-Reliable n-Colouring for a rectangular graph G gtri (2 − 1, ) . The idea is to add − 1 additional rows to G tri ( , ) by appending a 'mirror image' (reflected about the last row) of itself, as shown in Fig. 3 (refer to [6] for the detailed proof). For our second colouring construction, we use the 'probabilistic method' [1] , namely we choose the colour of each node in the square graph G tri ( , ) independently and uniformly at random from [n] . Although there is a finite error probability p that such a random n-Colouring will not be Weakly t-Reliable, we show that if n/t > 2.948 and we use a sufficiently large (but only linear in n) sharing parameter = O(n), then the error probability p can be made arbitrarily small. Moreover, p decreases exponentially fast with , so p can be easily made negligible.
Colouring C rand for graph Gtri( , ) with = O(n) and n ≥ 2.948t To analyse this construction, we will make use of the following counting Lemma. Here, for any right-left path in G tri ( , ), we define its length as the number of nodes on the path. We say a path is minimal if removing any node from the path disconnects the path. 
for some constants µ, c(µ), with µ ≤ 2.948. We call the minimal possible value for µ the connective constant of G tri ( , ).
Proof. For a minimal right-left path, there are possible starting nodes on the rightmost column. We may assume without loss of generality that the first edge of the path is not a vertical edge. For the ith starting node on the rightmost column, there are at most 2 possibilities for the first path edge: a horizontal edge, or a diagonal edge. For j ≥ 1, let N i (j) denote the number of minimal paths in G tri ( , ) of length j starting at the ith node on the rightmost column. Note that the paths counted in N i (j) are not necessarily right-left paths, i.e. the last node in the path need not be on the leftmost column. We use induction on j to show N i (j) ≤ 3 j−1 for j ≥ 2. We have already shown above the basis step N i (2) = 2 < 3. For the induction step, suppose that
Consider each path P of length j. We claim that there are at most 3 possible choices for adding a (j + 1)th node P (j + 1) to P to create a minimal path P of length j + 1. Let P (j − 1) and P (j) denote the (j − 1)th node and jth node of P , respectively.
Suppose first that P (j) is is a boundary node of G tri ( , ) (i.e. it is on row 1 or row or column 1 or column ). Then P (j) has degree at most 4, and one of the 4 nodes adjacent to P (j) is P (j − 1), so there are at most 3 possible choices for P (j + 1), as required. Now suppose that P (j) is an internal node of G tri ( , ). Then P (j) has degree 6, and one of the 6 nodes adjacent to P (j) is P (j − 1). Hence there are at most 5 possibilities for P (j + 1). But it is easy to verify that 2 of those 5 adjacent nodes of P (j) must also be adjacent to P (j − 1). Hence, neither of these 2 nodes can be chosen as P (j + 1) since the resulting path P will not be minimal (indeed, if P (j + 1) is chosen adjacent to P (j − 1) then internal node P (j) could be removed from P without disconnecting it). So there are at most 3 possibilities for P (j + 1) to keep P minimal.
We conclude that any minimal path P of length j can be extended in at most 3 ways to a minimal path P of length j + 1. It follows that
j , which completes the inductive step. Since there are possible starting nodes on the rightmost column, we get N P (k, ) ≤ · 3 k , which proves µ ≤ 3.
We now show how to improve the connective constant upper bound to µ ≤ 2.948. This improvement is based on the fact that the bound µ ≤ 3 only takes into account a '1 edge history' of the path to restrict the number of possible 'next' nodes by ruling out those which destroy the path minimality due to 3 node cycles. By taking into account m-edge history for larger m > 1, we can improve the bound by also ruling out m -cycles for m > 3. Here we examine the case of m = 4 edge history, ruling out m = 6 node cycles, as well as m = 3 node cycles (see [6] for some results with even larger m).
Consider the 6 node cycle C 6 in graph G tri ( , ) shown in Fig. 4(a) . For any minimal path P of length j ≥ 4 whose last 4 edges match a sequence of 4 successive edges along C 6 (in either clockwise or anticlockwise sense, such as the 4 edges between nodes P (j −4), P (j −3), P (j −2), P (j −1), P (j) in Fig. 4(a) ), we have at most 2 possibilities (labelled n 1 , n 2 in Fig. 4(a) ) for choosing a (j + 1)th node P (j + 1) to extend P to a minimal path P of length j + 1. This is because by minimality, only 3 possiblities are allowed for P (j + 1) to rule out 3-node cycles in P (as shown above), and out of those 3 nodes, one (labelled n * in Fig 4(a) ) can be eliminated to rule out the 6-cycle C 6 from being contained in P . This reduction from 3 to 2 possibilities for P (j + 1) when the last 4 edges of P match a sequence from C 6 will give us the improved upper bound on µ.
To analyse this improvement, let S(j) denote the set of all minimal paths P in G tri ( , ) of length j starting at the ith node on the rightmost column of G tri ( , ). We partition S(j) into 4 disjoint subsets S 1 (j), . . . , S 4 (j) according to the number of matches of the 4 last edges of P with a sequence of successive edges on C 6 , namely:
-S 4 (j) denotes the subset of paths in S(j) whose 4 last edges match a sequence of 4 successive edges along C 6 (in either clockwise or anticlockwise sense).
-For k = 3, 2, 1, S k (j) denotes the subset of paths in S(j) which are not in S k+1 (j), but whose k last edges match a sequence of k successive edges along C 6 (in either clockwise or anticlockwise sense).
For j ≥ 5 and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we say that a minimal path P of length j is in state k if P ∈ S k (j). We can now construct a finite state machine M whose state transition function specifies for each minimal path P of length j in state k, the possible 'next' state k of a minimal path P of length j + 1 formed by adding a (j + 1)th node to P . The state transition diagram of M is shown in Fig 4(b) , where a label b on a transition from state k to k indicates that there are b possibilities for the (j + 1)th node which lead to this state transition. For example, as shown in Fig 4(a) , if P is in state 4, then there are 2 possibilities for node P (j + 1): one (node labelled n 1 ) leads to a transition to state 1 (since no two successive edges in C 6 are in the same column), the other (node labelled n 2 ) leads to a transition to state 2 (since no three successive edges in C 6 are in the order 'horizontal, vertical, horizontal'). It is easy to verify that the same transition rule from state 4 holds for all paths P in state 4 (i.e. regardless of the particular sequence of 4 successive edges along C 6 which form the last 4 edges of P ). The transition rules for the other three states are also easy to verify. Remark 7. Our terminology connective constant for µ comes from similar (although not identical) constants defined in combinatorial studies of the 'self avoiding walk' in a lattice [14, 16] . However, the particular connective constant µ which arises in our work seems to not have been previously studied.
Remark 8.
We have done some preliminary numerical eigenvalue computations using MATLAB with larger values of the 'edge history' parameter m on the path, extending our method for proving Lemma 7 (refer to [6] for more details). Using m = 8 we obtained the improved bound µ ≤ 2.913, although we are not yet certain about the accuracy of these MATLAB computations. We believe the efficient techniques from [14, 16] can be useful to further improve our numerical computed upper bound on µ by using even larger values of the 'edge history' on the path. Also, our method of bounding µ does not take into account the restriction that the paths of length k are right-left paths, so further improvements might result by taking this restriction into account. Now we are ready to prove the following result.
